A Theory of Justice (Part Three)
The Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance
Welcome back to my third (and probably final) summary of John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’. This article will cover Rawls’ main arguments for “the original position”, the topic of chapter three. The original position is Rawls’ primary conceptual tool that he uses to develop his theory of justice. As such, chapter three is long and technically complicated. This summary necessarily omits many nuances and distinctions which Rawls considers important to his overall argument. Nonetheless, this article will serve a good place to start your understanding - but a bad place to finish. Go forth and read!
What is the original position, and why is it important? The original position (OP) is a heuristic device developed by Rawls to demonstrate this his two principles of justice are rational and would be selected under fair conditions to regulate the basic structure of society; hence ‘justice as fairness’. For a refresher on the two principles of justice and the basic structure of society, see part two of this summary.
Imagine yourself behind what Rawls calls a “veil of ignorance” - you have no information about your gender, class position, ethnicity, country of citizenship, or your natural endowments such as intelligence and physical capability. You are surrounded by others who are also ignorant of their particular characteristics. The distorting effects of social and natural inequalities have not yet taken hold. You are, as it were, in an original position of equality vis a vis your fellow citizens. If no one knew what position they were to occupy within society, what type of society would they choose to live in?
Spoiler alert: you would choose a society in which everyone had equal basic liberties (freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on) and the only permissible economic and social inequalities are those which benefit the least advantaged. Basically, you would choose Rawls’ two principles of justice rather than utilitarianism or some other ethical theory. Of course, this conclusion is by no means self-evident. We have to make a number of assumptions about the psychological make-up of those in the original position. All theories rely on assumptions for simplicity’s sake. It’s up to you whether you think Rawls’ assumptions are reasonable or not.
First, we assume that people are concerned above all else with furthering their own interests. This immediately rules out classical utilitarianism, since no (rational) person would choose to live in a society that maximised overall utility at the expense of a minority. For all we know, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, we might be those who suffer under a utilitarian conception of justice. No person in the original position would agree to live in a society whose primary goal is the maximisation of utility at any cost.
Another problem immediately presents itself: how can people be self-interested if they don’t know anything about themselves and the interests they are pursuing? To get around this epistemic hurdle, Rawls asserts that everyone has a “higher-order” interest in ensuring their freedom to define and redefine their interests. We want to be free to choose our own conception of the good life. Therefore in the original position we are interested in securing for ourselves the means to pursue our concept of the good life, whatever it turns out to be. To do this, we want access to a basic minimum of primary social goods (social liberties, income, wealth, etc.). This is why the first principle of justice is more rational, as seen from the original position, than the principle of utility: it guarantees a basic minimum to pursue our interests that utilitarianism does not.
A second but related assumption is that people in the original position are mutually disinterested. This means that I do not care what your life plans are, provided that they do not impinge upon mine, and vice versa. Rawls later writes that people in the original position have access to basic facts about human psychology. Whether mutual disinterest accords with basic human psychology is, shall we say, a rather charitable assumption. Surely our sense of justice includes the belief that people who are entirely self-interested are worse than those who dedicate time to helping others. Maybe you disagree. In any case, I digress.
Another condition stipulated by Rawls is that the principles of justice chosen in the original position must be transparent and public knowledge. We are supposed to know what principles of justice our society strives to uphold. The reason given for this is, I think, quite ingenious and perhaps Rawls’ best argument. His reasoning is as follows.
A consideration given to any social form is its long-term stability. There’s no point striving for a perfect social system if it proves unstable in practice. One of the benefits of Rawls’ two principles of justice is that once instituted, they generate their own support and thus stabilise themselves. Justice as fairness ensures that everyone’s conception of the good is treated with respect. Respect from others helps us respect ourselves. People with self-respect are generally kinder, less envious and more respectful towards others. By enshrining mutual respect into the basic principles of society, justice as fairness generates more social harmony, and ironically, more utility than utilitarianism.
A utilitarian might respond that if mutual respect really did generate more utility, then a utilitarian society would undoubtedly encourage mutual respect. Here Rawls is softening up utilitarianism for his knock-out blow. Remember, the principles of justice agreed to in the original position must be public knowledge to all. A utilitarian society which publicly upheld the principle of maximising utility even at the expense of an unfortunate few does not, by definition, enshrine mutual respect into its founding principles. Everyone living in a utilitarian society would know that their life prospects are provisional, subject to revision if a more efficient way of maximising utility is discovered.
A utilitarian society does not meet an individual’s higher-order interest in guaranteeing the freedom to define and pursue our own version of the good. Members of such a society, knowing that their life prospects are provisional, would not feel respected by the basic structure of society. A utilitarian society would therefore become unstable by generating envy and resentment among those it disenfranchised. No one would rationally assent to living in a utilitarian society, even if they somehow knew it would benefit them, because it would eventually fall apart. Utilitarianism is irrational.