A Theory of Justice (Part Two).

Reading 'A Theory of Justice' by John Rawls

No one asked me, but I’m back with more John Rawls content anyway. Trust me, writing these in-depth summaries is the least I can do to make this reading experience more enjoyable. That’s not to say that Rawls is boring per se, just that his argument is so considered and nuanced that it’s like building a sand castle one grain of sand at a time. It takes so damn long.

So, what am I talking about today? Well, in chapter two of A Theory of Justice (2nd ed. 1999) Rawls begins to develop his principles of justice; those principles which he believes will be adopted in the “initial situation” and their correct interpretation. I know I mentioned these principles in part one, but that was in their final formulation given in Chapter five. Here, Rawls wants to develop these principles slowly so that their final interpretation appears natural to the reader. Grains of sand, as I said.

First, Rawls wants to remind us what we are applying these principles of justice to. It’s probably best to quote Rawls directly here:

“The primary subject of the principles of social justice is the basic structure of society [emphasis added], the arrangement of major social institutions into one scheme of cooperation.” (Rawls 1999, p. 47)

Principles of justice regulate the basic structure of society which includes institutions such as parliaments, free markets, the constitution, the legal system, and so on. Rawls’ project is to ensure that the basic institutional structure of society is just. We judge a society to be just or unjust depending upon how it stacks up against our principles of justice.

Just one final note before I (re)introduce the principles themselves. Provided that the basic structure of society is just (and carried out accordingly), we needn’t trouble ourselves with individual cases of injustice. You might feel that certain aspects of your life are unjust - and you may be right about that. But unless you can criticise the structure of society from a general perspective (i.e. not as Louis Devine but as a person born into x social class as a member of y ethnic group) then your complaint is not a systematic political critique but a personal gripe. Personal grievances are not within the purview of a theory of justice.

Now, to the principles themselves. In their embryonic form they read:

“First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.

Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all”.

Rawls adds further that these principles apply to the “basic structure of society and govern the assignment of rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages” (1999 p. 53). Clearly the first principle relates to basic political liberties whereas the second relates to one’s social and economic (i.e. material) position within society. It is interesting to note that while the first principle is absolute - no one can have more liberties than another - the second principle allows for some degree of inequality, provided that it is to “everyone’s advantage”.

Rawls argues that these principles must be adopted in “serial order” such that the first principle is always prior to the second. This means that people cannot give up their basic liberties even if it resulted in economic gains. But surely any disparity in economic terms opens up the possibility that political equality exists in name only? Everyone has an equal right to vote but not everyone can donate to political candidates, for example. So far, Rawls has not preempted this criticism and responded in a compelling manner. But I digress.

Obviously the second principle can be interpreted in a myriad of ways, some less egalitarian than others. Rawls ultimately adopts an interpretation he calls “democratic equality” as distinct from so-called natural liberty, liberal equality, and natural aristocracy.

The first and most obvious way to interpret the second principle is through the lens of natural liberty. Natural liberty interprets “everyone’s advantage” as meaning the most efficient system available. Obviously effiency is important but it is obvious that highly efficient systems can also be remarkably unjust. Rawls reasons that for a system to be just, we must not only accept the distribution of resources, but the “basis upon which over time the initial distribution of assets is determined” (p. 62). Natural liberty interprets part (b) of the second principle as a society in which all careers are open to those with talent. Rawls thinks that this is unjust because over time the initial distribution of assets is strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies that are morally irrelevant. For example, no one choses their parents. And yet one’s home life significantly determines their educational outcomes. It would be unjust if society let these advantages accumulate over time. A society in which highly paid positions are open to talent does not meet the criteria of justice.

Liberal equality refines natural liberty by arguing that not only should careers be open to talents, but that “all should have a fair chance to attain them”. The underlying intuition here is that: “the expectations of those with the same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class” (p. 63). This is often called equality of opportunity. Although Rawls thinks this is “clearly preferable” to a system of natural liberty, in which no provision is made for equality of opportunity, it is still insufficient for the principles of justice. Liberal equality allows the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents, but this natural distribution is morally arbitrary. Winning (or losing) the genetic lottery should not determine your life chances.

Natural aristocracy sees no problem in structuring society along the lines given by the natural distribution of talents. Aristocratic apologists would argue that society as a whole benefits if the naturally talented are allowed to accumulate more wealth and power than others. Rawls here simply relies on intuition to assert that this is unjust. Allegedly we believe that all persons are morally equal, so differences arising from morally arbitrary factors are clearly unjust.

So how does Rawls permit the emergence of inequality? Any inequality must benefit the “least advantaged members of society” (p. 65). The intuition underlying this interpretation of justice is that the distribution of natural talents is a “common asset” and the purpose of society is to “share in the greater social and economic benefits made possible by the complementarities of this distribution”. Rawls thinks this a rational interpretation and that those with natural advantages will accept it as just. This is because advantaged individuals will recognise that their higher life expectations depend to a certain extent on those with lower life expectations.

We can illustrate how this plays out in daily life. Someone with naturally high cognitive abilities is able to devote their time and resources to acquiring an education and getting a highly paid job only because there are people taking care of more basic concerns. Universities would collapse without cleaners and maintenance workers, for example. Therefore the university professor’s higher income is only justified if it benefits those without an education. We might want to quibble about the details of this example, but Rawls point is always to be taken from the position of a general class representative, not actual individuals. Therefore if a society which enables those with higher educations to earn more money than those without, and if this is to the benefit of the least advantaged in society, then this arrangement is just.

I want to say a little more about the content of the goods which Rawls thinks the principles of justice regulate the distribution of. We are not talking about the distribution of hardcover philosophy books or boxing gloves - that would certainly make me happy but not many others. We are talking about the distribution of primary social goods - “things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants” (p. 79).

Another way of thinking about primary social goods is that they are the means by we pursue our individually chosen ends. My life-goals include becoming a successful academic and a less-than mediocre martial artist. Fulfilling these goals would make me, as a unique individual, happy. A just society is one that fairly distributes the means for individuals to pursue their own life goals, however they define them. Liberalism does not adjudicate between people’s various conceptions of the good life, provided they are not hurting anyone else. “It is assumed”, writes Rawls, that “members of society are rational persons able to adjust their conceptions of the good to their situation.” This is sometimes called liberal neutrality; liberalism does not prescribe a theory of the good life. That is up to each individual.

So, in closing: we have the two principles of justice and their interpretation which Rawls thinks it would rational for free and equal persons to assent to the “initial situation”. Rawls must now interpret the initial situation itself. But you will have to wait for another article for me to get to that.